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SUBJECT: The CCP Article, "More on the Historical Experience
of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", as an Expression
of the International Communist Party Line for 1957

1. Purpose:

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This is the first in a new series of [redacted] briefs on significant
current developments in International Communism prepared to:

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25X1A2d1 a. furnish background to desks [redacted] or [redacted] and 25X1A2d1
[redacted] exploitation;

25X1X7 b. make available short papers which may be passed to [redacted] 25X1X7
[redacted] appropriate key government officials.

2. Use:

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25X1A2d1 Desks at [redacted] are requested to determine the actual utilization
of the document and to determine the relative priority of [redacted] and 25X1A2d1
[redacted] interests. In case the attachment is used as exchange material,
appropriate comments from [redacted] are requested. For your 25X1X7
information the attachment was used by headquarters for general
25X1A2d1 [redacted] guidance.

3. Summary :

The attached brief shows that the 28 December statement:

- a. is an expression of the International Communist Party line, and
therefore of great significance;
- b. coincides with recently stated Soviet positions to such an extent
that Soviet participation or inspiration seems plausible;
- c. coincides particularly with Khrushchev's New Year's statement
as reported authoritatively;

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- d. indirectly acknowledges that the damage done to the cohesive-ness of International Communism by the de-Stalinization process and the fermentation in the Bloc is considerable, and that the Stalin issue still is the main vulnerability of Communist ideology since it affects the validity of the Soviet system;
- e. attempts to talk the Stalin issue out of existence by returning to the "subjective" and highly unsatisfactory interpretation of the secret Khrushchev speech in order to save the "system", thus bypassing the 30 June Resolution of CC/CPSU;
- f. upgrades Stalin by stating that his accomplishments outweigh his mistakes;
- g. maintains the line on "correcting Stalin's mistakes" but puts emphasis on the attack on "revisionists" (Tito, Poles, et al.); indicating that elements in favor of "liberalization" must be liquidated on a priority basis in order to deny the West any "subversive" assets;
- h. subordinates problems arising out of relations between Communist Parties and States to the common interests of the Bloc and International Communism as a whole, emphasizing Soviet leadership and unity against imperialism, i.e., a hostile, defensive posture;
- i. finds it necessary to restate the fundamental Bolshevik program as a universally applicable formula, and thus openly advocates principles which conflict with important tenets of the Panch Shila;
- j. coincides in its upgrading of Stalin with the recent reemergence of Malenkov.

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